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Journal of Legal Commentary
residency requirement for admission on motion as violative of the
privileges and immunites clause leaves the residency rules in the
five states that continue to enforce them in jeopardy."
The practice of law is expanding into multistate specialties. 0 It
is submitted that once an attorney has passed the multistate bar
examination and has practiced for the requisite period of time, he
should be admitted to practice in any state without having to 're-
side in that state or take its bar exam. In Friedman, the United
States Supreme Court, in an effort to further this trend, has
struck down residency requirements to practice on motion in what
may signal the death knell for all residency requirements associ-
ated with bar admission.
Robert Cote
ETHICS OF CONDUCTING Ex Parte INTERVIEWS
A lawyer who communicates informally with an adverse party
without first obtaining opposing counsel's consent runs the risk of
violating the norms of professional ethics.' The determination of
whether such a violation has occurred is particularly difficult when
the adverse party is a corporation." The Supreme Court has held,
' See supra notes 33 and 38 and accompanying text.
o See Brakel & Loh, supra note 1, at 699-702.
See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 4.2 (1983). The text of the rule
states:
"In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the repre-
sentation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter,
unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so." Id.
The language of Rule 4.2 resembles that of the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBIL-
rry which states:
During the course of his representation of a client the lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representa-
tion with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has
the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law
to do so.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsIBILrry DR 7-104(A)(1) (1980). See generally
Kurlantzik, The Prohibition on Communication with an Adverse Party, 51 CONN. B.J. 136, 138
(1977) (reason for rule is "imbalance in knowledge and skill between the lawyer and the
adverse party, who is generally a layman.").
" See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977) (since corpo-
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for example, that for purposes of the evidentiary rule of attorney-
client privilege in federal cases, lower-level employees of a corpo-
ration may be considered "the client". By contrast, in some state
courts, corporate employees qualify as the client for purposes of
attorney-client privilege if they are members of the corporation's
control group."
One issue that has arisen is whether these approaches to the
question of attorney-client privilege also govern an attorney's abil-
ity to conduct ex parte communications with the employees of a
corporate adversary. Some authorities have suggested that any
corporate employee may be interviewed on an ex parte basis with-
out regard to the scope of the corporation's attorney-client privi-
lege.5 Many commentators, however, agree that certain personnel
should not be contacted without prior approval by the corpora-
tion or corporate counsel.' The difficulty arises when the courts
ration acts only through its agents, identity of client is unclear). See generally Miller & Calfo,
Ex parte Contact with Employees and Former Employees of a Corporate Adversary: Is it Ethical?,
42 Bus. LAW. 1053, 1053 (1987) (although opposing counsel would like to contact employ-
ees of corporation, this practice is questionable due to ethical considerations); Note, Evi-
denee - Privileged Communications - The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting: A
Suggested Approach, 69 MicH. L. REV. 360, 364 (1970) (same); Note, Privileged Communica-
tions - Inroads on the "Control Group" Test in the Corporate Area, 22 SYRACuSE L. REV. 759,
759 (1971) (corporation as "client" is problematic due to being "abstract legal entity" op-
erating through agent's acts).
See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981).
Middle-level and indeed lower-level employees can, by actions within the scope of
their employment, embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties, and it is only
natural that these employees would have the relevant information needed by corpo-
rate counsel if he is adequately to advise the client with respect to such actual or
potential difficulties.
Id.
' See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 111. App. 2d 103, 432 N.E.2d
250 (1982) (control group of corporation includes advisers upon whom top management
relies, but not individuals who merely supply information); OR. R. EVID. 503(1)(d); TEX. R.
EVID. 503(a)(2).
I See International Business Mach. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1975). In
general, courts frown upon placing constraints on an attorney's ability to gather informa-
tion from prospective witnesses. Id. See also Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another Lawyer's
Client: The Lawyer's Veto and the Client's Interests, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 683, 708 (1979). Profes-
sor Leubsdorf states: "[O]pposing counsel should be free to contact directly any employee,
high or low, who is a possible witness without notice to the employer's counsel. The public
interest in obtaining testimony should not be frustrated by the massive embargo that a
warned employer could impose." Id.
, See, e.g., Kurlantzik, supra note 1, at 145-46 (important not to have individuals with
knowledge violate privileges); Miller & Calfo, supra note 2, at 1053 (distinctions should be
made between current employees involved in controversy, those not involved and former
235
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attempt to discern precisely who these key people are.'
Jurisdictions and bar associations across the United States have
devised four major tests to determine which employees may not
be interviewed ex parte: the "control group" test,8 the "flexible
control group" test,' a "balancing" test10 and a "speaking agent"
employees); Nath, Upjohn: A New Prescription for the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Prod-
uct Defenses in Administrative Investigations, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, 14-15 (1981) (courts
faced with determining who is "client").
' See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 4.2, comment (1983). The comment
identifies three types of persons which fall within the scope of the Rule 4.2 prohibition. Id.
The protected parties include: (1) persons having a managerial responsibility on behalf of
the organization, (2) and with any other person, (a) whose act or omission in connection
with that matter may be imputed to the organization or (b) whose statement may constitute
an admission on the part of the organization. Id. See, e.g., Mompoint v. Lotus Dev. Corp.,
110 F.R.D. 414, 418 (D. Mass. 1986) (determination of whether employee is protected
depends on topic of questioning and scope of employment); Massa v. Eaton Corp., 109
F.R.D. 312, 314-15 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (current plant managers, though not high level
management, protected); Frey v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32,
35 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (corporation's "alter ego" is protected).
8 See Alabama State Bar, Op. 83-81 (1983) (lawyer litigating against a corporation may
interview, ex parte, only those non-official, non-managerial employees who have no author-
ity to speak for or bind corporation); Alaska B.A., Op. 71-1 (1971) (lawyer may conduct ex
parte interviews with corporate employees who do not represent the corporation in matters
related to dispute); Arizona State Bar, Op. 201 (1966) (lawyer may contact non-administra-
tive municipal employees without prior notice and consent of the city's counsel); Los Ange-
les County B.A., Informal Op. 1976-1 (counsel may interview corporation's employees if
they are non-management and interviewing attorney informs employees of his identity). See
also San Francisco B.A., Informal Op. 1973-4 (plaintiffs attorney may interview non-mana-
gerial employees of hospital without notice to opposing counsel); Colorado B.A., Op. 69
(Rev.) (6/20/87) (plaintiff's attorney may interview former corporate employees without
consent of entity's counsel provided interview excludes any communications which are sub-
ject of attorney-client privilege and may interview current employees if bystanders who
lack authority to commit organization); Idaho State Bar, Op. 21 (1960) (counsel for plain-
tiff may interview any defendant corporate employee except directors or officers); Illinois
State B.A., Op. 85-12 (1986) (opposing counsel may not conduct ex parte interviews of any
employees whose actions or statements can bind or be imputed to the corporation); Mary-
land State B.A., Op. 83-4 (1982) (ex parte interview with corporate employees who share a
degree of identity with corporate entity prohibited).
' See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981). For the purpose of deter-
mining which corporate employees were covered by attorney-client privilege, the Upjohn
Court rejected the control group test because employees other than those in the corpora-
tion's control group may have been involved in communications with the corporate attor-
ney. Id. See also Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 103 Wash. 2d 192, 202, 691 P.2d 564, 570
(1984) (court referred to test applied in Upjohn as "flexible control group" test); Los Ange-
les County B.A., Op. 410 (1983) (ex parte contacts with any employee of corporation that is
involved in subject of controversy is prohibited); Massachusetts B.A., Op. 82-7 (1982) (ex
parte interviews with corporate employees concerning subject matter within scope of their
employment prohibited); Minnesota State B.A., Op. 5 (7/86) (ex parte interviews with any
corporate employee who has managerial responsibility impermissible); New York State
County Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 528 (1964) (current corporate employees
who can either bind the corporation or occupy ministerial positions protected from ex parte
236
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test."' This article will examine each of these approaches.
Control Group Test
The control group test allows opposing counsel to freely inter-
view all corporate employees except those whose decisions control
corporate policy.12 In Fair Automotive v. Car-x Service Systems,1 3 the
Appellate Court of Illinois used the control group test in deter-
mining that the employees contacted by plaintiff's investigator did
not have sufficient decision-making authority to be considered
part of the corporation's control group."' As a result, ex parte
communication with these employees was permissible.' 5
interviews); New York City B.A., Comm. on Professional Ethics, Inquiry Reference No. 80-
46 (1980) (no ex parte interviews of corporate defendant employees about any matters
which are within the scope of their employment).
'0 Mompoint v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 110 F.R.D. 414, 418 (D. Mass 1986). In Mompoint, the
court stated that when deciding whether to allow an ex parte interview of a corporate de-
fendant, it is impossible to devise a rule. Id. An order barring a one-sided interview would
"depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case." Id. A balance must be
struck, according to the court, between the attorney's need for information and the corpo-
ration's need to keep the communications privileged. Id. See also Maryland State Bar, Infor-
mal Op. 78-27 (1978). Low level corporate employees may be interviewed but a managing
agent may not and any request to interview an employee who falls between these extremes
must be decided on the facts of the case. Id.
1 See Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 103 Wash. 2d 192, 201, 691 P.2d 564, 569 (1984).
When deciding whether a corporate employee was a party to the litigation for the purpose
of allowing or prohibiting ex parte contact with the employee by opposing counsel, the
court stated: "We hold the best interpretation of 'party' in litigation involving corporations
is only those employees who have the legal authority to 'bind the corporation in a legal
evidentiary sense, i.e., those employees who have 'speaking authority' for the corporation."
Id.
See also Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 756 P.2d 138, 142 (1988). The court held:
"opposing counsel could interview employees of the corporation ex parte so long as such
employees were not authorized to speak for the corporation or in a management status."
Id. (quoting Wright, 103 Wash. 2d at 201, 691 P.2d at 569).
See also Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250, 253 (D. Kan. 1988) In Chancellor,
the court defined the "speaking agent" test as a sui generis determination based on a corpo-
rate employee's level of managerial responsibility, whether his or her acts with regard to
this matter could be imputed to a corporation for civil or criminal liability, and whether
the employee's statements could be an admission on the part of the organization. Id. Ac-
cording to the Federal Rules of Evidence, statements of current employees can be treated
as binding admissions of a corporation if they concern a matter within the scope of their
agency or employment. FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2)(D).
I, See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
128 II1. App. 3d 763, 471 N.E.2d 554 (1984).
14 471 N.E.2d at 561. The Court noted that the corporate employees interviewed could
not be considered within the top management of the firm. Id.
" Id. See also Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa.
1962). The court stated:
Journal of Legal Commentary
In McKitty v. Board of Education,1 a federal court in the South-
ern District of New York applied the control group test to a small
school district and concluded that the plaintiff McKitty could con-
duct ex parte interviews of any school district employee except
those who participated in any way in the decision to terminate her
or deny her tenure." The court in McKitty rejected the school
board's argument that the flexible control group test employed in
Upjohn v. United States " controlled.' The board, arguing by anal-
ogy, reasoned that if the Upjohn Court had declared that it was a
violation of the evidentiary rule of attorney-client privilege to al-
low the government to acquire the memoranda representing cor-
porate attorney interviews with non-control group employees,
then the McKitty court should apply this reasoning to the ethical
question of allowing ex parte interviews with school board
employees.'
Magistrate Tyler, writing for the court in McKitty, first pointed
out that Upjohn protected only "communications" between client
and attorney and not the underlying facts of the case.21 The court
then dismissed the school board's contention that the question of
the ethical propriety of interviewing school board employees was
an evidentiary issue under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D),
which exempts from the hearsay rule any statements made by em-
ployees within the scope of their employment while employed.'
Magistrate Tyler doubted that statements made by teachers about
employment practices of the school district were within the scope
of their employment," but relied upon the reasoning of Frey v.
[I]f the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in a
position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action
which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if he is an au-
thorized member of a body or group which has that authority, then, in effect, he is
(or personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the
privilege would apply.
Id.
, No. 86 Civ. 3176 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
1I Id.
449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981).
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Department of Health and Human Services " to reject this argu-
ment."5 The Frey court had concluded that if employees are non-
parties for the purposes of DR 7-104, then they are also non-par-
ties for the purposes of the Federal Rules of Evidence."
Flexible Control Group Test
The flexible control group test precludes ex parte contact not
only with people who formulate corporate policy, but also with
those who execute it.' 7 The United States Supreme Court in
Upjohn v. United States " applied the flexible control group test to
determine whether memoranda and notes taken from a corporate
counsel's interviews with corporate employees not in the control
group were protected by attorney-client privilege. 2" The Court re-
versed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals"0 and held that the
communications of employees outside of the corporation's control
group should also fall within the attorney-client privilege. 1 The
Supreme Court noted that the control group test was too narrow
106 F.R.D. 32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
See McKitty v. Board of Education, No. 86 Civ. 3176 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1987)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
'4 Frey, 106 F.R.D. at 38.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
8s 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
" Id. at 391-97. The flexible control group test, according to the Upjohn Court, protects
not only those who act on the attorney's advice but the employees who supply information
to the attorney, making it possible for him to provide reliable counsel. Id. at 390. In a
corporation, the Court reasoned, employees in the middle and lower tiers who are not in
the control group may have information which the corporate attorney needs to know. Id.
at 391.
The Supreme Court's flexible control group test is based upon an earlier Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals case in which the court noted that an attorney may need information
from middle or non-management employees. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572
F.2d 596, 608-09 (8th Cir. 1978). See generally Nath, Upjohn: A New Prescription for the Attor-
ney-Client Privilege and Work Product Defenses in Administrative Investigations, 30 BUFFALo L.
REV. 11, 37 (1981) (outlines effect of Upjohn on attorney-client privilege doctrine).
'o See United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383
(1981). The federal appeals court had held that only communications made to personnel in
the corporation's control group - the top management - would be shielded from ex parte
interviews by opposing counsel. Id. at 1226-27.
3' See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391. The Court reasoned that the narrow restriction of the
attorney-client privilege by the circuit court of appeals would make it difficult for corporate
attorneys to give advice to employees who are not within the control group of the corpora-
tion. Id. at 392. The Court further stated that the lower court's test was difficult to apply
and left the parties involved without a test to determine if particular discussions would be
protected. Id. at 393.
239
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because employees who are not in the upper echelon of corporate
management but execute policy decisions would not have their
communications with counsel shielded from discovery. 2 In Massa
v. Eaton Corp.83 a federal district court in Michigan used the
Upjohn logic for determining the scope of attorney-client privilege
in a corporation as the appropriate standard for DR 7-104(A)(1)."
The court quoted bar opinions from Michigan,"3 San Diego" and
Los Angeles" to support its position that although non-manage-
rial employees could be questioned ex parte, managerial level em-
ployees, even if not technically within the control group, could
not be so questioned. 8 The court thus extended DR 7-104(A)(l)9
to include for "the sake of certainty and predictability" any mana-
gerial level employee of a corporation. 0
The California Appellate Court echoed this holding in Mills
Land and Water Co. v. Golden West Refining Co.4 Here the court
disapproved of an opposing attorney who had contacted a director
of the defendant corporation who was no longer a member of the
company's control group.42 The court, quoting a Los Angeles
" Id. at 391-392.
" 109 F.R.D. 312 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
" Id. at 314. The court stated that while Upjohn did not concern DR-7-104, its logic was
"easily carried over." Id.
I d. at 314 (quoting Michigan State Bar Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics,
Informal Op. 535 (June 18, 1980)).
" Id. at 314 (quoting San Diego B.A. Ethic Comm. Op. 1984-85, reprinted in ABA/BNA
Lawyer's Manual of Professional Conduct, Current Reports Vol. 1, No. 24 at 555) (ex-
panded view of DR 7-104(A)(1) to include restriction of ex parte interviews with employees
similarly situated to those in Massa).
"7 Id. (quoting Los Angeles County B.A. Formal Op. 410, reprinted in ABA/BNA Law-
yer's Manual of Professional Conduct) (construed DR 7-104(A)(1) as precluding communi-
cation with employees who are not necessarily top management).
" See Massa, 109 F.R.D. at 314. "While the new Model Rules have not yet been adopted
in Michigan, I am not persuaded that Michigan's application of DR-7-104 would allow the
conduct of Plaintiffs and their counsel in this case." Id.
* See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
,0 Massa, 109 F.R.D. at 315.
41 186 Cal. App. 3d 116, 230 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1986). This case concerned the propriety
of opposing counsel contacting a former corporate president who was a current member of
the board of directors and a shareholder of the corporation. Id. at 120, 230 Cal. Rptr. at
462. The trial court disqualified plaintiff's attorney from further participation in the law-
suit and the appellate court affirmed that disqualification. Id. at 120-21, 230 Cal. Rptr. at
462.
" Id. at 127-28, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 467. The court noted that even though the director
who was contacted was not in the control group of the corporation, the ex parte contact
would not be permissible without a court order. Id. at 128, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 467. The
240
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County Bar Association opinion, reasoned that although the em-
ployee could no longer bind the corporation, having resigned as
an officer, as a director he continued to be privy to information
which could compromise the effectiveness of the corporation's
counsel." The court further concluded that "an attorney may not
make a unilateral decision on the application of rule 7-103 involv-
ing a corporate party." 4
Balancing Approach
In addition to the control group and flexible control group
tests, a court may use an analysis which balances a plaintiff's need
to acquire information with the corporation's need to shield key
personnel from an ex parte interview." In Mompoint v. Lotus Devel-
opment Corp.," the court had to determine if opposing counsel
could question defendant's employees out of the presence of the
corporation's attorney.' The court first determined whether the
employer had "good cause" to prevent plaintiff's attorney from
court pointed out that directors guide the business of a corporation, owe a fiduciary duty
to the corporation, control litigation and attend board meetings where litigation may be
discussed by the corporate attorneys. Id. The court added, "If anything, a director embod-
ies a corporation to an even greater extent than does a salaried employee." Id. at 129, 230
Cal. Rptr. at 468.
" Id. at 129-30, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 468. (quoting Formal Op. No. 410 of the Los Angeles
B.A. (1983)). Guided by Upjohn, the court adopted the bar association's rationale for rejec-
tion of a control group approach: the difficulty in determining who is a member of the
control group; the likelihood of the employee prejudicing his own or the corporation's
position through binding statements or admissions; and the corporation's interest in pre-
serving information for release to opposing counsel without benefit of corporate counsel.
Id.
" Id. at 131, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
" See supra note 10 and accompanying text. See generally Satzberg, Corporate & Related
Attorney-Client Privilege, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 279, 280 (1984) (difficult to implement the
attorney-client privilege so "that corporations receive appropriate, but not excessive
protection").
4. 110 F.R.D. 414 (D.C. Mass. 1986). In Mompoint, a corporate defendant wanted to pre-
vent the plaintiff from conducting an ex parte interview of employees in an action for al-
leged wrongful termination. Id.
4" See Mompoint, 110 F.R.D. at 418. "the question becomes in what circumstances does a
corporate party show 'good cause' . . . for the entry of a protective order which prohibits
opposing counsel from communicating with its employees except with corporate counsel's
consent." Id. Plaintiff's counsel wanted to question corporate female employees about al-
leged sexual advances the plaintiff made to them at the time plaintiff was a corporate em-
ployee. Id. The court noted that the female employees had already complained to someone
in authority at the corporation and the corporation thus had the records of the complaints
and the testimony of the people who heard the complaints available to it. Id. at 418-19.
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communicating with its employees without corporate counsel's
consent.48 Rejecting any attempt to develop a specific test, the
court instead decided to proceed on a case by case basis, balancing
the interests of the plaintiff and the corporate defendant.4' The
court in Mompoint held that there was no "good cause" shown for
the entry of a protective order restricting plaintiff's counsel from
interviewing employees of defendant's corporation without the
presence of the corporation's counsel. 50
Speaking-Agent Test
When a court employs a broad speaking-agent test, it shields
from ex parte interviews all agents or employees whose words or
actions might legally bind the corporation."1 In Wright v. Group
Health Hospital,"' for example, the Supreme Court of Washington
concentrated on communications between a corporation's coun-
selor and its employees." The court then went on to define the
term "party" within the meaning of DR 7-104(a)."' The court
concluded that "party" referred to those having authority to le-
gally bind the corporation." Since the people that the plaintiff
46 Id. at 419.
" See Mompoint, 110 F.R.D. at 418-19. According to the court in Mompoint, an initial
inquiry would be "whether or not the subject matter of opposing counsel's inquiries to the
employee is such that the employee's statements are likely to be admissible against the
corporation." Id. at 418. See FED. R. EvID. 801 (d)(2)(D). According to this rule, an em-
ployee's statements to opposing counsel are admissible against an employer if they concern
a matter within the scope of the employee's employment. Id.
A further inquiry, according to the court, would be whether, in a particular case, it was
necessary for "effective representation" that corporate counsel consent to and be present
for an interview of an employee by opposing counsel. Mompoint, 110 F.R.D. at 418.
"C Mompoint 110 F.R.D. at 419. The court found that in the present case, the plaintiff's
need to gather evidence outweighed the interest of the defendant in having its attorney
present at the interview. Id. The court reasoned that having opposing counsel present at
the interview would "inhibit the free and open discussion which an attorney seeks to
achieve at such interviews." Id.
"' See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
" 103 Wash. 2d 192, 691 P.2d 564 (1984).
65 Id.
" See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Wright, 103 Wash. 2d at 201, 691 P.2d at 569.
In setting out a speaking-agent test, the court stated: "We hold the best interpretation of
.party' in litigation involving corporations is only those employees who have the legal au-
thority to 'bind' the corporation in a legal evidentiary sense, i.e., those employees who have
'speaking authority' for the corporation." Id. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, state-
ments by lower level employees can "bind" a corporation as admissions as if made within
242
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wanted to interview were no longer with the corporation, the
court reasoned that they had no authority to bind the corporation
and could be questioned."
Recently, in Chancellor v. Boeing Co.,5" a federal district court in
Kansas employed the speaking-agent test,58 stating that it was (1)
consistent with the ABA's most recent approach; 59 (2) in accord
with DR-7-104(A)(1)'s protective purpose and (3) flexible enough
to keep the testimony of employees accessible to all sides."0 How-
ever, the court in Chancellor went further than Wright by holding
that former employees could also be "parties" protected from ex
parte interviews if their acts and omissions concerned the subject
matter of the litigation and were thus imputable to the corpora-
tion.61 Thus, Chancellor banned ex parte contact with two distinct
groups of employees: those with managerial authority as well as
those whose actions as agents could bind the corporation."
the scope of their employment. See FED. R. EvID. 80 1(d)(2)(D). See also Miller & Calfo, supra
note 2, at 1058 (evidentiary rules would allow lower level employees to bind corporation).
Accord Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Inquiry Reference No. 80-46 (1980). When the opposing counsel wants to question corpo-
rate employees, if the subject of the interview is within the scope of the employee's duties,
then that employee must be considered to be a party to the litigation. Id.
" Wright, 103 Wash. 2d at 201, 691 P.2d at 569. The Wright court would not have
allowed opposing counsel to hold ex parte interviews with corporate employees if they had
managing authority: "We hold 'current' group health employees should be considered
'parties' for the purposes of the disciplinary rule if, under applicable Washington law, they
have managing authority sufficient to give them the right to speak for, and bind, the corpo-
ration." Id. (emphasis added). Because those who were sought to be interviewed were no
longer employed by the corporation, they could not "speak" for it and the court permitted
the ex parte interview. Id. See also Miller & Calfo, supra note 2, at 1056 (outlines Wright
approach).
"' 678 F. Supp. 250 (D. Kan. 1988).
" Id. at 253. The court held that a corporate employee is a "party" pursuant to DR-7-
104 (A)(I)(A) if: "he or she has managerial responsibility, his or her acts or omissions in
connection with this matter may be imputed to the corporation for purposes of civil or
criminal liability, or his or her statements may be an admission on the part of the organiza-
tion." Id.
Id. (construing ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct 71:314 (1984)).
"Id.
Il d. The court emphasized that the former employee's acts or statements must be "in
connection with the matter in representation." Id. See also Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Mary-
land Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36, 39-40 (D. Mass. 1987) (former employee could be inter-
viewed ex parte because his acts could not be imputed to corporation).
U Chancellor, 678 F. Supp. at 253-54.
243
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CONCLUSION
A variety of tests have been formulated to determine who, in
the corporate setting, is a "party" protected from an ex parte in-
terview. It is submitted that in light of recent case law, 63 an attor-
ney should refrain from interviewing ex parte employees or agents
with managerial or speaking authority to bind the corporation.
Eugene P. Gurr
" See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
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